Missio politica on Coalition Governance: 'better devils' in SA Coalition Politics

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Abstract

Missio Dei has both total salvation and the attainment of the all-encompassing kingdom of God as central objectives, meriting the participation of all sectors of human society. However, as the resulting circumstances of several African developing countries can attest, the unsustainably disruptive nature of Governments of National Unity (GNUs) or coalition governments contradicts such unifying divine mandate. Using South Africa's coalition politics, where the likelihood of forming coalition governments depends on who is the "better devil", this paper draws on the literature to make a strong argument against the coalition government model. Accordingly, using the framework of *missio politica* to test the mandate of democratic politics in fulfilling the objectives of *missio Dei*, it is argued that coalition government models are usually at odds with *missio Dei* or the mandated objectives thereof.

Keywords: *Missio Dei*, *missio politica*, South Africa, coalition politics, missiology.

Introduction

In parliamentary or semi-parliamentary states, it is necessary for political parties to secure at least more than 51% of the parliamentary seats in order to enjoy the status of being an absolute majority with power over governance. A coalition government is a form of government in which, in multi-party states, two or more political parties join forces through negotiations to form a majority government. In such parliamentary or semi-parliamentary states, it is necessary for running political parties to secure at least more than half 51%+ of legislative seats in order to form a stable government. With few exceptions like Britain, France and Spain, many countries around the world are governed by coalition compositions. There are several political reasons for a coalition government, including but not limited to the need for an interim government after a national crisis, the lack of a single political party with a majority in a parliament after national elections. Amongst world countries, the United Kingdom (UK) is perhaps the most prominent example of countries which had to form a coalition or national government at the time of the national crisis of 1931-1940 (Newson, 2011:1-16).

In comparison, the Federal Republic of Germany have long operated with coalition governments composed of majority parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its sister parties in the form of the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), since the German Federal elections since the 1960s have repeatedly failed to produce a single party with an absolute majority in parliament. In Africa particularly since the re-introduction of political pluralism in 1990s, most countries like Kenya which to date represents how electoral coalition can be used to unseat entrenched ruling party (Adar, 2008:52-76; Khadiagala, 2008:4-32), or Mauritius as one of the few with a long tradition of coalition government (Carroll, 1999; Mathur, 2012; Mukonoweshuro, 1991), a multi-party system of governance in Mozambique (Kulipossa, 2006).

In South Africa, particularly since the African National Congress (ANC) victory of nearly 63 % of the votes in the first national democratic elections in 1994 to date (Southall, 1998:443-444), the ANC has retained the status of being the dominant party with the upper hand over national governance, and coalition governance has become a common trend characterizing provincial and local politics. In particular, the early 2000s local government elections to the recent ones in 2021 came to be characterized by lively attempts at coalition governance. Several scholars have opined that thedesire for coalition governance has been necessitated by the fact that most South Africa have lost confidence in ANC's ability to govern the country on its own (Phala, 2016; Lannegren & Ito, 2017). However, the struggle to negotiate a coalition, and then to form a governing coalition, has become a notable feature of political engagement between opposing parties. The lack of team spirit within coalition politics is more evidenced by the nature of coalition relations which are informed by the approach of ''better devil's'. In 2016, the President of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Julius Sello Malema used the notion of a ''better devil'' referring to the Democratic Alliance (DA) as their preferred choice for coalition government instead of the African National Congress (ANC).

By using the notion of the ''better devil'' in the context of the coalition government, Malema saw the ANC's inherent behaviour as essentially evil and led to the wilful harming of most South Africans. What will become clear through the course of this paper is the existence of centrifugal forces which retain desires to keep their political culture, identity and influence against efforts of joint objectives or consensus. To this end, relying upon the rich literature on coalition politics, this paper make use of *missio politica* to problematize the concept of coalition governance against the mandate of the *missio Dei*, and argue that it decentralizes efforts to unify societies into the spirit of common good and makes the function of government machinery more complex at the expense of service delivery.

In order to substantiate the unsustainability of coalition politics and governance in the face of the broader unifying mandate of the *missio Dei*, this paper will first explore the idea of Government of National Unity (GNU) as a temporary mechanism which becomes problematic when treated as a long term solution in governance. Secondly, it will immediately attempt on problematizing coalition governance through analysis of hostile demonizing language used by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader, Mr Julius Sello Malema who made use of words such as the 'better devil' in referring to the EFF's prospective coalition partners. Thirdly, the problematization of GNUs or broadly coalition governance in the face of such hostilities are then juxtaposed with the unifying efforts of the *missio Dei*, against which the idea of coalition governance is conclusively discounted as being unsustainable.

Missio politica within *Missio Dei*

The discourse of the *missio Dei* represents an important aspect that authenticates the field of missiology in its entirety and as such does not need an exhaustive introduction since there is an extensive literature presenting its background, development and subsequent understanding (Engelsviken, 2003:481-497). However, it is important for this study to merely mention that the last few years since the International Missionary Council (IMC) conference in Willingen, Germany, in 1952 have resulted in an ever-growing missiological scholarship that explores mission as the result of the nature the Triune God (Flett, 2009:5-18; Richebacher, 2003:588). According to Bosch (2011), Karl Barth is one of the early theologians who attempted to articulate mission as the action of God himself (Bosch, 2011:399). In other words, such resultant scholarship correctly ascribes the commission of mission to the Triune God as its sole source. Notably, Willingen came about as a result of the effects of the first world war (1914-1918) promptly leading to the second world war (1939-1945) (Joll & Martel, 2013; Mosse, 1986:491-513), and particularly in the wake of the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the Civil War which lasted from 1927 until 7 December 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party gained the upper hand leading to its occupation of the mainland of China (Cucchisi, 2002; Pepper,, 1999). As the result, Christian missionary projects fell into the receiving end of political hostilities, some killed and most left with no option but resort to their sending countries

(Ling, 1999; Zarrow, 2006). Read into the context of global political instabilities, this crisis forced the mission discourse to shift virtually from a human-centered to a God-centered mission theology (Brandner, 2018:7-30; Hopkins, 2005). In other words, there is a transition from placing the task of mission in the hands of human beings to realizing the presence of God as the only source and ultimate goal of mission in the world.

Against the above picture displaying the politically unsettled missionary background, the *missio politica* framework emerged in an effort to anchor political discourse on behalf of the *missio Dei* (Garcia, 2006; Saayman, 1991). In other words, *missio politica* is a missiological framework testing the objectives of world politics within or as they relate to the broader mandate of the *missio Dei* (Reimer, 2017; Verkuyl, 1979; Verkuyl, 1989). Its goals is none other than ensuring that political discourses are not removed from the mandate of the *missio Dei* (Thinane, 2022:1-8). To that end, and citing the applicability of the *missio politica* in the context of coalition politics or governance, this paper further argues that caution is warranted lest hostile coalition governments be prolonged at the expense of governance stability and consequently alienated from the *missio Dei*.

The argument is to be made underscoring the need to focus on influence a majority party into developing policies that will ensure a prolonged government stability and consequently enable citizens into participating in the fulfilment of the *missio Dei*. As it shall be demonstrated by the reminder of this paper, overwhelming literature on GNUs or generally coalition governance, suggest that such method of governance remains good as a temporary measure to allow stable governance, and that if prolonged, they tend to fragment the country's governance into an unworkable machinery that would, as per the argument of this paper, work against the overall unifying spirit of the *missio Dei*. Finally, or in addition to the underlined observation that some political leaders from most parties appear only interested in soliciting power for financial gain rather than political ends, the prevailing hostile sentiment among potential coalition parties who are likely to form government is seen as contradicting the unifying goals of the *missio Dei*. Such animosity is underscored from the recent pronouncements by the leader of the EFF, who may have used terms like 'better devil' or ''worse devil'' as a propaganda technique to dehumanize other political parties he was referring to and portray them as destructive evil aggressors. Consequently, the view of this paper is intended to be that such divisive or demonizing language remains detrimental to the project of unity in governance, and perhaps even more contrary to unifying efforts around the goals of the *missio Dei*.

Government of National Unity

As mentioned above, a Government of National Unity (GNU) is formed by a broad coalition composed of all participating political parties in Parliament, which are designated a key players in the transition from a national political crisis, such as war, systems of oppression, or as a bridge from a deeply divided past to reasonably stable governance. The rationale behind such collective efforts is to ensure inclusive participation in the process to end the undesirable political circumstances and advance prospects of national stability. There exist an extensive literature exploring GNUs as a measure to manage national conflicts across nations of the world and particularly in Africa (Kadima & Kasenally, 2005:133-164; Mapuva, 2010:247-261). For example, Luxembourg, one of the Western European countries, saw the formation of at least two GNUs each as a result of a national crisis, the first being formed during World War I in 1916 and the second being formed on the trail of World War II in 1945 (Colmer, 2003; Thiltgen, 2010: 1227-1270). In Africa, following the 2007 presidential election which resulted in spiral violence (Ajulu, 2007:33-50), Kenya was ruled by the GNU, with the National Unity Party (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) sharing governing power from 2008 to 2013 (Adar, 2008:52-72; Kadima & Owuor, 2014:150-180). In Zimbabwe, after a national crisis that led to a massive migration of its citizens in 2008, three major political parties, namely, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) entered into an agreement to form a GNU in 2009 (Dodo et al., 2012; Chinyere &

Rukema, 2020). Still within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, Lesotho was governed by the GNU after three consecutive indecisive electoral outcomes in 2012, 2015 and 2017, bearing no single party claiming outright victory ('Nyane & Kapa, 2021; Banerjee & Rich, 2017). Although the political circumstances that necessitated the formation of NGUs in these countries vary widely, the common factor is the disharmony and hostility between political parties, which often leads the GNUs or coalition arrangements to catastrophic collapse.

In South Africa, following the political hegemony enjoyed by the National Party (NP) prior to the early 1990s, the theme of national unity became important in anticipation of the definitive end of the apartheid regime, and consequently found expression in the 1991 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which resulted in the founding of what came to be referred to as a Transitional or Interim Constitution. This constitution established a five-year framework for the GNU that included all political parties that won more than 5% of the vote in the then-upcoming 1994 national elections (Nolutshungu, 1992:607-625). Consequently, it has been in the interests of such spirit of unity that instrumental bodies such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) were instituted under the auspices of the Act for Promoting National Unity and Reconciliation, No. 34 of 1995. That being said however, although efforts contained in the formation of the GNU remained good as a temporary measure to allow the negotiated transition, it proved itself to be deeply destructive leading to its dissolution following the withdrawal of the NP from GNU just a day after the final constitution was adopted on 08 May 1996 in the National Assembly (NA). In other words, just as it has been the case with many other countries across the world, GNUs continue to remain instrumental only as a tool to ensure transition into a more stable governance. The understanding of temporary nature of GNUs is perhaps reflected better in the recent call by Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Thabo Makgoba who called for the establishment of GNU in during the wake of calls for President Cyril Ramaphosa to resign amidst the damning findings involving theft of huge sums of money at his Phala Phala farm. Bishop Makgoba stated:

> I call for the establishment of a government of national unity under a respected elder to stabilise the country until the next election. And during the next year we need to hold an economic [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] to address the real crisis facing the country, which is the scandalous gap between those who benefit from intergenerational wealth and those who are locked out of the economy (Modise, 2022; Felix, 2022).

The literature on GNUs and coalition leadership thus seems consistent with Bishop Makgoba's understanding that the instrumentality of such a mechanism would only be limited or maintained in the face of a perceived crisis and would be discarded in the wake of stability. As the next sections will show, while GNUs can remain good in theory or be effective for lasting conflict transformation, the trail of the disruption they are causing seem to suggest strongly that GNUs ought to be seen as once off mechanisms allowing countries to set up conditions that will enable transition to a more stable political context. Any extension of such an ideally temporary mechanism opens the door to unhealthy rivalry on public platforms by most political parties with an understandable inability to endlessly bury political or ideological differences. When political parties are forced or coerced to negotiate power-sharing for the advancement of governance, but end up resorting to displaying their animosity towards one another to the point of using derogatory terms like "evil" and "devil" in reference to their potential coalition partner, it is in itself disastrous for efforts to stabilize governance. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper will show that such a public display of hostility, insults and hatred, harboured by the supposed coalition partners not only harms the chances of full national unity, but also disrupts the important business of stabilizing the government, and worse undermines the unifying aim of the *Missio Dei*.

Coalition Demonisation

Language in general and words in particular are very powerful and can be used as a tool to build societies and equally they may be used as a weapon by some to maliciously discriminate against, demonize or dehumanize their fellow human beings as a hostile group (Battistella, Allan & Burridge, 1993). Demonization of fellow human beings as enemies, particularly in a competitive space such as politics, is a propaganda technique intending to give the impression that the other person or party is monstrous, harbours evil intents and destructive objectives (Halfin, 2007; Hiebert, 2003:243-255). In other words, those employing this technique do so to brand their opposition as devils with purely evil motives. However, one thing that is very clear about demonizing others is that it has the ability to stir up deep hatred, resulting in a situation where members of the demonized party are being abused or worse, brutally killed. In fact, it has been observed in the psychological literature that the only way to make it easy for people to kill others is to justify such killing by making them look as deeply evil as possible (Daly & Wilson, 1990; Grossman, 2014). Once this is accomplished, the killers of such an individual no longer feel guilty and find it very easy to proceed with the killing of a dehumanized human as if they were killing an animal. For example, during the height of World War I, Adolf Hitler could easily mobilize hatred against Jews, demonizing them as parasites and bloodsuckers whose existence required extermination (Balint, 1952:355-362; Mussolff, 2014:218-233).

Similarly, during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists first demonized and dehumanized Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus by calling them snakes and cockroaches before killing them within 100 days between April 7 and July 15 (Rothbart & Cooley, 2016; Straus, 2007). In such cases, the demonizing party gives the impression that they are the Sons of Light, called to wage war against the Sons of Darkness. The case of the South African apartheid regime is a case in point where whites were seen as a superior race who needed protection from contagion through contact with blacks as an inferior race, leading to the need to ordain policies that would practically eliminate the presence of black race from within white communities (Wolfe, 2006:387-409).

On the contrary, it was the apartheid system that was demonized as evil and a crime against humanity (Lingaas, 2017:86-115; Slye, 1999). It is conceivable that a brief review or analysis of what was meant by the demonization of apartheid as an evil system would help current efforts to problematize the coalition government, particularly given the similar use of demonizing and dehumanizing language by some (EFF) in clear contrast to the aspiration and the purported unifying spirit of coalition. Such coalition hostilities are ponderously viewed or treated as analogous and reminding of apartheid hostilities. To that end, as Mashau (2018) charges, publicly perpetuating hostilities and dehumanizing others in this way remains contradictory, detrimental to the rainbow dream of a united South Africa, and reminiscent of how apartheid eventually became a crime against humanity (Mashau, 2018:1).

Apartheid an Evil System

Before moving on to the three major political parties in South Africa, which are the focus of this article, it may be necessary to first understand what was meant by declaring apartheid to be both a sin and an evil system, so to speak. Surely this background will go a long way towards understanding the implication behind calling the ANC the devil, the DA the 'better devil' and EFF the representative of justice or even better the righteous angel engaged in a just war.

In its broadest sense, sin can be described as a shameful, deplorable, or utterly wrong act against the holiness of God, or better still, it refers to an immoral act considered as a gross violation of divine law and against God himself (1 John 3:4; Deuteronomy 9:7; Joshua 1:18). Several studies have discoursed over what was meant by referring to apartheid as a sin. It is only important to note here that this description of apartheid as a form of sin was widely circulated and hotly debated in the 1950s, when Anglican Bishop Archbishop Trevor

Huddleston (1913-1998) stated in his book 'Naught for your Comfort' that the Apartheid racism in any form is heresy and blasphemy against the nature of God (De Gruchy & Villa-Vicencio, 1983; Huddleston 1956). After considering the malicious racist motivations behind policies of apartheid and the evil inherent in it as a system, the United Nations in 1966 resorted to declaring it to be a crime against humanity. According to Lingaas (2017) between 1946 and 1993, about 14 General Assembly resolutions had condemned apartheid as such (Lingaas, 2017:105). Subsequently, the language of describing apartheid as inherently evil was then adopted by several churches through conferences including but not limited to the first Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa (MCSA) which in 1982 declared that: 'apartheid is not simply a socio-political policy, but a sinful contradiction of the Gospel which cannot be justified on biblical or theological grounds and is therefore, an ideology which the Methodist Church rejects as a heresy' (De Gruchy, 1983:182-183; Shongwe, 1998:66).

In other words, apartheid was viewed as a blasphemous, heretical, sinful and, above all, evil system systematically engineered by the devil to torment and alienate the black people of South Africa from God and his purpose. In fact, Archbisho Desmond Tutu in his May 1988 speech at his investiture as chancellor of the University of the Western Cape stated unequivocally: 'apartheid is so utterly evil, immoral, unbiblical and unchristian that it can only be compared with that equally evil system – Nazism'(Ashforth, 2015:365). Those responsible for evil acts of apartheid would then be called evil men and women similar to how Adolf Hitler is often called the most evil men in history of humanity (Rosenbaum, 1998). Perhaps such includes the likes of Hendrik Verwoerd as apartheid architect and Eugene de Kock who earned the nickname of 'Prime Evil' for himself (Breckenridge, 2005:83-108; Kamin, 1999:132). This then explains why scholars such as Gibson (2006) would indiscriminately label all the perpetrators of apartheid injustices as evil tormentors, as he lamented: 'Stories about the most profoundly injured victims (or they families) granting forgiveness to their evil tormentor are stuff of which soap operas are made' (Gibson, 2006:86).

In short, whenever a regime turns into a draconian or heartless system, analogous to Pharaoh's hardened heart at the plight of the Israelites (Exodus 8:15-32), such a regime is viewed by its victims as inhuman and serving the interests of Satan, the evil one from whom God is asked in the Lord's Prayer to deliver his children (Matthew 6:13). Thus, whenever the oppressive and cruel regimes such as the Nazi regime in Germany, Stalin's regime in Russia, Mao Zedong's regime in China and the apartheid regime in South Africa were declared evil, it meant that they were deeply immoral, evil and consequently representations of the powers of the devil against the will of God.

Evil and the Devil

In order to understand what evil is, good as an attributive adjective is first described, from which the contradictory concept of evil can be derived. In other words, the concept of good is here used to qualify the existence of evil. In general, anything considered good means that it is in a desirable condition or perfectly acceptable for a particular purpose. To the contrary, evil refers to anything that is bad and in an undesirable condition or unacceptable for a particular purpose (Geach, 1956:33-42). In theology, the problem of evil has traditionally been understood as impermanence or contradiction to the nature of God, as He is perceived as perfectly good by believers in the major monotheistic religions (Stump, 1985:392).

The understanding or meaning of evil takes a different turn when it comes to the question of God's providence and the problem of evil. Understanding evil in this sense underscores that God, by His omnipotent nature, is responsible for both good and evil (Hasker, 1992:91-105; Migliore, 2004:117-136). However, consistent with its specific focus and scope, this article is primarily interested in the issue of evil as the antithesis of God, and not necessarily in the theological discourse on God's providence and evil. In other words, for this article, the term evil denotes the antithesis of God. Furthermore, evil is not used literally in this paper to demonize any particular group of people, but is merely used metaphorically to denote undesirable evil as opposed to what is considered good. This is consistent with Singer's (2004)

use of this term, noting that: 'The term (evil) is typically used as the generic opposite of morally good. Thus there are constant references to good and evil, not to good and bad' (Singer, 2004:185).

The Biblical Devil

The biblical character devil as a designation referring to the prince of evil spirits, the personification of evil and God's adversary is identified with several figures in the Bible including but not limited to the serpent first in the Garden of Eden, Lucifer, Satan the tempter of the Gospels, Leviathan and the Dragon in the Book of Revelation.

In the Old Testament, the devil is not depicted as a person, but as a subtle animal (serpent) performing ferocious functions later attributed to Satan or the devil (Caldwell, 1913:29-33). The word Satan is from the Hebrew term שָׂטָן as in Job 1:6 *haś-śā-ṭān* (הַשָּׂטָן) and almost similarly the generic word for serpent in Hebrew is *nahash* (נָחָשׁ) which is used to refer to divinations with supernatural wisdom or cunning animals (like snake) with a high reputation for wisdom (Genesis 30:27; Numbers 23:23; Matthew 10:16). Perhaps the cunning and cruel nature of the serpent is expressed or described more accurately by other Hebrew words like *shephiphon* (שְׁפִיפֹן): 'He will be a snake by the road, a viper in the path that bites the horse's heels so that its rider tumbles backward' (Genesis 49:17), *pethen* (פֶּתֶן): 'Their venom is like the venom of a snake, like a cobra that shuts its ears, refusing to hear the tune of the charmer who skilfully weaves his spell' (Psalm 58:4-5), *epheh* (אֶפְעֶה): 'He will suck the poison of cobras; the fangs of a viper will kill him' (Job 20:16), *qipoz* (קִפּוֹז): 'There the owl will make her nest; she will lay and hatch her eggs and gather her brood under her shadow. Even there the birds of prey will gather, each with its mate' (Isaiah 34:15), and many other terms which seeks to uncover the character of the serpent, or the devil so to speak (Clapham, 1973:221-222; Murison, 1905:115-130).

Similarly, in the New Testament, several words are used to identify Satan or the devil. Such Greek words includes but are not limited to *ophis* (ὄφεις): 'Behold, I am sending you out like sheep among wolves; therefore be as shrewd as serpents and as innocent as doves (Matthew 10:16), *echidnon* (ἐχιδνῶν): 'But when John saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees coming to his place of baptism, he said to them, "You brood of vipers, who warned you to flee from the coming wrath?', (ὄφεις and ἐχιδνῶν): 'You snakes! You brood of vipers! How will you escape the sentence of hell?' (Matthew 23:33). Furthermore, the Greek term *diabolos* (διαβόλος from διαβάλλω) translates to the devil as the who is regarded as the slanderer, false accuser of God, Satan, prince of demons, author of evil, and one who first alienates people from God and ultimately leads them to sin. Jesus made use of this term to refer to the devil while explaining the parable of the Weeds by stating: 'and the enemy who sows them is <u>the devil</u>. The harvest is the end of the age, and the harvesters are angels' (Matthew 13:39).

Similar to the understanding of evil above, the term devil, although often used to refer to Lucifer, Satan, fallen angel, the serpent or demonic spirit with the tendency to disrupt the will of God (Brown, 2011:200-214), is used broadly in this article to refer to mischievous conduct of individuals or group of people, as Malema used it to refer first to the DA as the 'better devil' and to the ANC as the 'worse devil' by implication.

A 'Better' and 'Worse Devil'

The phrase: ''better devil'' comes from the shortened proverb: 'better the devil you know' which simply means something bad but known is better than something unknown (Titelman, 2001). In other words, dealing with a bad thing you already know and have encountered is preferable to an unknown thing. Perhaps, to put it in a way closer to how Malema used it, it's better to deal with something that's known to be dangerous than deal with something that could turn out to be much worse. However, it is important to distinguish between DA as the 'better devil' and the DA as better than the ANC. The fact that Malema called the DA the 'better devil' in no way means that he meant the DA is much better than the ANC, but he did suggest that it's

better to work with the known devil (DA) than what could turn out worse (ANC). In other words, he would know what to expect from the DA, as the well-known devil, instead of the unpredictable ANC, which could be far worse. At this point, it may be helpful to analyse Julius Malema's outspoken critics of the DA to understand what he meant when he called them the 'better devil'.

The Democratic Alliance as a 'Better Devil'

Julius Malema never failed to openly criticize the DA leaders for their 'racist tendencies', often even associating them with the apartheid regime. Back in 2010, when Julius Malema was still President of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), he is said to have said at a rally in front of around 3,000 people in Cloetesville, just outside of Stellenbosch, that Helen Zille was a representative of apartheid: 'We have no respect for Helen Zille. Why are we asked to respect a person who built open toilets? Helen Zille is a representative of apartheid' (News 24 2010; SAPA 2010). Similarly, in 2014 during a media briefing in Cape Town while responding to a question on the draft Expropriation Bill, Julius Malema called Helen Zille 'the number one racist' saying: 'We can't vote Helen Zille -- the most racist, the number-one racist in South Africa -- into power. We are not drunk. If Helen Zille takes over this government, she will unashamedly, and without hiding it, take us back to the land of misery and pain'. Although this was aimed at the leader of the DA, there was no doubt that it indirectly branded the entire party as the number one racist. In fact, Julius Malema is further quoted as saying: 'If such a racist organisation, which represents backwardness, exploitation of our people, exclusion of the black people from the mainstream economy, that is what DA is. And we can't vote for such a thing into power' (News24, 2014; SAPA, 2014). Again in 2018, after the then DA Member of Parliament (MP), John Steenhuisen (incumbent) had called EFF MPs VBS Bank looters, Julius Malema reacted by calling him a: 'racist young white man who was accused of rape (News24, 2018; The Citizen, 2018).

The African National Congress as a 'Worse Devil'

Although Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Sello Julius Malema implied that the African National Congress (ANC) was the devil in his speech on the decision to vote with the Democratic Alliance (DA), it would be misleading to take his statements literally to mean the ANC is the devil while the DA is the 'better devil'. Instead, he used the devil as a familiar metaphor or idiom, perhaps to help illustrate or explain his views on both the ANC and the DA to his audience. In other words, it is conceivable that he used the term devil to emphasize how he felt about the mischievous characters of these two political parties in South Africa at the time. Better still, he tried to describe the ANC as a kind of mischievous ruling party that harbours malice in its ranks. Perhaps there is no easier way to judge the accuracy or appropriateness of using demeaning terms such as devil, corruption, and immorality when describing or talking about the once world-renowned Liberation Party (ANC) which defeated the evil apartheid system than to highlight some of its damaging controversies that have caught the attention of most South Africans, particularly since 2011, and more recently a worrying picture painted by State-Capture Reports. The big question that comes to mind when the ANC is called the devil is whether the ANC has characteristics of a snake in its behaviour? Perhaps the following analysis briefly outlines the incredibly exhaustive stories of the callousness and extraordinary evil that some members of the ANC continue to evince towards the plight of ordinary South Africans, particularly the poor masses.

Since the ANC's victory of nearly 63 % of the votes in the first multiracial democratic elections in 1994 led by Nelson Mandela (Southall, 1998:443-444), subsequent and consecutive elections show that South Africans have lost some confidence in their ability to govern the country (Phala, 2016; Lannegren, & Ito 2017). Since its coming to power, the ANC instituted several policies that have led to a path that has joined it as party and state institutions (Nattrass, 1994:343-359). Consequently, this has led to a catastrophe of favouritism whereby members or supporters of the ANC and their close relatives are favoured for government employment and its senior officials are placed in key positions in such government institutions

(Cedras, 2021:72-76). This opened the door to unprecedented forms of fraud and corruption, extravagant displays of wealth, rampant factional movements within the ANC and much more. All these has led to a situation where even rank and file members of the ANC, along with their leaders, are seen as thoroughly corrupt and indifferent to the plight of poor people in South Africa. All of this added some bitter salt to the deepening wounds of high unemployment, inequality in the distribution of wealth, poor service delivery, poor economy, poor health care system and the like. As a result, the ANC has since been publicly criticized for its poor governance, abandoning the impoverished people of South Africa in favour of self-enrichment (Martin & Solomon, 2016:21-35). In short, the ANC appears to have changed character from good to immoral since 1994, continuing to lose legitimacy and public trust, toppled by corruption and factional infighting, all of which contribute to its toxic relationship with its constituents, particularly poor South Africans. That is to say, the one political movement that used to be considered the adored people's party has suddenly become the enemy of the people, the loathed public devil, so to speak.

Perhaps because of the above disturbing image of the ANC, many people in South Africa have openly said that the ANC is a little worse than the apartheid system (Van Onselen, 2018). As if to explain the better and 'worse devil' analogy, in 2011, after the South African Foreign Office was alleged to have refused to issue a visa to the 14th Dalai Lama, the late Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu openly said the ANC was a disgrace and worse than apartheid: 'Our government is worse than the apartheid government, because at least you were expecting it from the apartheid government' (TimesLive, 2011). Similarly, in 2012 during his expulsion form the ANC as its Youth League (ANCYL) president, Julius Malema addressed the mine workers at the Aurora mine in Gauteng at Grootvlei, Springs area of the East Rand saying: 'We are worse [off] than we were during the times of apartheid. We are being killed by our own people. We are being oppressed by our own government' (TimesLive, 2012). Later in 2018, during a media briefing, he reiterated his statement and backed it up by arguing that South Africa's healthcare system was much better under apartheid than under the ANC. He then pointed to a clinic in his hometown that had been built by the apartheid government and only to be closed by the ANC government under democracy, saying: 'and then when we say to you, the apartheid was much better than these people (ANC) you think we are exaggerating' (YouTube, 2018).

'Better Devils' in Coalition Government

Although the ANC has continued to govern South Africa at the national level since the first national democratic elections in 1994, the local elections that began in 2000 and recently culminated in the sixth local elections in 2021 have resulted in local governments with more hanging municipalities wherein few if any political parties claiming more than 50% of the seats in the municipal councils, making a coalition government inevitable (Booysen, 2014:66-90). Consequently, many commentators have rightly argued that the results of the 2021 local elections show more than ever that South Africa is moving from dominant political party politics to coalition government (Sebola & Sekatle, 2020; Moshodi, 2018). This system requires opposing political parties to hold coalition talks and work together despite their hostilities and ideological differences, hence scholars such as Booysen (2021) have authored books entitled: 'Marriages of inconveniences: the politics of the coalition in South Africa'.

Although EFF's leader Sello Julius Malema called the DA the 'better devil' his party would rather enter a coalition government with, the inherent implication of this phrase will surely set the course of coalition politics in South Africa for many years to come. The South African coalition government will be made up of opposing political parties who must work together for the betterment of South Africa while recognizing that their coalition terms are built on being 'better devil's. In other words, most political parties entering into a coalition agreement in South Africa will approach such a relationship with some hostility, suspicions and seeing each other as 'better devil's to say the least. In other words, while these parties have a willingness to rise above their ideological differences to form governments, such willingness will not eliminate

the inherent animosity between them as opposing parties. Even if there is a common goal behind the coalition agreements for the benefit of society, this will not lead to parties becoming the darlings of politics. In fact, as it has been the case with some parties already, it is likely that in most cases the parties will enter coalition agreements as 'better devil's and become 'worse devil's at the end of such a union. Unless this untenable system is abandoned, as Mashau (2014) would put it in relation to the land issue, ironically in the coalition-stricken city of Tshwane, South Africa continue to sit 'on a time bomb which is already ticking and ready to explode' (Mashau, 2014:192).

Conclusion

To the extent that arguments against coalition governments have successfully shown that enduring coalition government is in fact unsustainable and tends to divide societies rather than foster true unity, this paper challenges missiological scholarship to examine whether extended coalition governments can be used to help fulfil unifying goals of the *missio Dei*. For its part, this paper concludes that coalition politics, and thus enlarged GNUs, insofar as they serve to foment the spirit of disunity and encourage conflict rather than to end it, contravenes the unifying goals of the *missio Dei*. Accordingly, this paper consulted the literature and drew on *missio politica* to successfully argued that any mechanism such as coalition governance, which can be used to maliciously to against prospects of true national unity, stable government, and the unifying efforts of the *missio Dei*, ought not to be tolerated nor prolonged beyond their temporary significance. This paper concludes that coalition politics and GNUs should only be seen as temporary, exceptional measures relevant to specific contexts and not treated as a one-size-fits-all while inadvertently disrupting the unifying objectives of the *missio Dei*.

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