Religious Fundamentalism and Violence in the Name of Religion

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Abstract

This article aims to reveal the strengthening of the tendency of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia in the Action to Defend Islam that occurred during the period 2016 to 2018. In its implementation, this action always voices Islamic symbols in a textual and rigid manner, for example "non-Muslims who disbelieve" and the prohibition on making disbelievers as leaders. Uniquely, these actions were not carried out with any violence, neither did they trigger violence in the name of religion. Why did this action not lead to religious violence even though this action was clearly in the name of religion? This study finds that there are at least three factors that prevent this action of Islamic fundamentalism from acts of religious violence, namely: first, moderate Muslim infiltration in carrying out the actions, second, there is support from great scholars such as Ustadz Arifin Ilham and Ustad AA Gym who are known to be gentle and polite to all parties, and the third is the content of the Islamic Defense Action activity which is dominated by *dhikr* which is ritual prayer or a litany practiced by Muslims for the purpose of glorifying God and attaining spiritual excellence and general prayer.

Keywords: Islamic; fundamentalism; non-violent; demonstration; defending Islam 212.

Introduction

The political leaders in Indonesia oversee multiethnic and multireligious societies and have to a large extent frustrated hardline religious groups from having an emphatic authority in politics. Indonesia has clearly to an extent at least, been a stronghold of moderate and also some Islamist ideologies.This article departs from the research conducted in 2018 after seeing the unique phenomenon in the series of demonstrations for the Indonesian Defending Islam Action in the period from the end of 2016 to 2017. This action was carried out in the name of religion, but unlike the defense action in the name of religion which was in general coloured by violence and destruction, on the other hand, this action was peaceful and filled with a ritual dimension. As a characteristic of this action, all participants wore white clothes with turbans as costumes for prayer, *dhikr*, and prayer which were the main activities. This social movement, which is inspired by the strong ritual of prayer and dhikr, has become a cooling force for demonstrations so that they do not become violent and anarchic actions which disturb civil society.

Initially, the Defending Islam Action began with the response of Indonesian Muslims to the statement of the Governor of DKI Jakarta Basuki Cahaya Purnama alias Ahok who was considered to have insulted the Qur'an. Because of a slip of the tongue, Ahok's statement escalated into a blasphemy case which resulted in the detention process and he was sent to prison. Ahok's statement seemed unintentional because the moment of the statement was

during his visit to the grouper cultivation program review on Pramuka Island, Seribu Islands on 27 September 2016. Ahok's statement which seems to be trivial was as follows: "It's possible that in deepest heart, you don't vote for me because you were lied to using Surah Al Maidah 51. That's your right. If you feel you can't vote because you're afraid of going to hell, you'll be fooled. what, because this is a personal call from your father and mother."

This statement actually seems insubstantial and even for some Muslim scholars it is not considered an insult. It was only after a journalist like Buni Yani uploaded the video to his Facebook account and captioned the post "Defamation of Religion," did the reaction occur relating to the video. Protests over the alleged blasphemy began to be shown by elements of society. The first reaction was initiated by protests by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of South Sumatra Province reporting Ahok's case to the police.

The condition of the Indonesian people after Ahok's statement in the Thousand Islands was filled with a lot of public discussion regarding the alleged blasphemy of the Qur'an. Social media such as Youtube and Facebook are the two social media that show the most variety of responses and even criticism of Ahok's statement. As a result, there was unrest in the community because other negative discourses had also emerged, such as; anti-Chinese, anti-PKI sentiments, the proliferation of hate speech, and hoaxes abound.

Related to this unrest in society and taking into account the demands of the community, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) responded by issuing a fatwa regarding the status of Ahok's statement. MUI in response to Ahok's statement stated that Ahok had committed blasphemy against Islam, especially the Qur'an. Take a look at some of the following MUI decisions:

> First, the Qur'an Surah Al-Maidah verse 51 explicitly prohibits making Jews and Christians as leaders. This verse is one of the arguments for the prohibition of making non-Muslims as leaders. Second, scholars are obliged to convey the contents of Surah al-Maidah verse 51 to Muslims that choosing a Muslim leader is obligatory. Third, every Muslim must believe in the truth of the contents of Surah Al-Maidah verse 51 as a guide in choosing a leader. Fourth, stating that the content of Surah al-Maidah verse 51 which contains a prohibition on making Jews and Christians as leaders is a lie, the law is unlawful and includes the category of blasphemy against the Qur'an. Fifth, declaring a lie to the ulama who conveyed the argument of Surah al-Maidah verse 51 regarding the prohibition of making non-Muslims as leaders.

Although on October 10, 2016 Ahok had apologized for his controversial statement, it could not stem the protests of Muslims which were expressed in the form of demonstrations. On October 14, 2016, thousands of members of the Muslim community staged a demonstration in front of the Jakarta City Hall to demand that Ahok be punished for his statement which was deemed blasphemous to Islam. This was the first action that had become the trigger for the subsequent demonstrations which were later named the Defending Islam Action. It is no exaggeration to say that this inaugural action has been the inspiration for many later actions to defend Islam, even though it is no longer about Ahok. A series of actions as a form of protest against religious blasphemy recorded eight actions, including: 14 October 2016 (1410), 28 October 2016 (2810), 4 November 2016 (411), 2 December 2016 (212), 11 February 2017 (112), 21 February 2017 (212 volume 2), 31 March 2017 (313), and 5 May 2017 action (Action 55). Until now, the actions of Indonesian Muslims still often use almost the same terms, such as the 299 Defending Islam Action, the Defending Ulama Action, and the Defending Tawhid Action.

The euphoria of the Defending Islam Action was so great that some people almost connected it with the phenomenon of the birth of Islamic populism. On the sidelines of the Defending Islam Action, articles and views of several scientists regarding this phenomenon emerged by relating it to the phenomenon of Islamic populism. Azra in an article in the Republika Daily stated that there was a link between various Islamic Defending Actions and Islamic Populism. According to him, "Regardless of the different layers of the masses who took part in the big action, the leaders of the action and their supporters saw the 212 action as a sign of the rise of Islamic populism. Action 212 in particular caused euphoria about the unity and revival of Indonesian Islam, both religiously, politically and economically."

The article sought to reveal indications of the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia in the phenomenon of the Action to Defend Islam that occurred in the period from 2016 to 2018. Since its implementation at the end of 2016, the Action to Defend Islam has always voiced religious symbols textually and rigidly. The terms of non-Muslims who are infidels and the prohibition of making infidels as leaders are slogans that always emerge. In the initial spotlight, the Action to Defend Islam symbolizes the existence and increasing tension of Indonesian Islamic fundamentalism. However, there is a need for in-depth research on this phenomenon since it is important to ascertain whether it is a phenomenon of religious fundamentalism and how this could increase a tendency towards religious violence. This is important given that considering that religious fundamentalism is usually associated with religious violence in most such cases.

Research Methods

This research used a descriptive-analytic method with a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach emphasizes the aspect of data accuracy, by using an inductive approach, meaning that data was sought, collected and abstracted (Nazir, 2009). Furthermore, the research favored the descriptive approach because, such an approach is capable of examining the status of a group of humans, an object, condition, system, thought or something that is in a class of events in the present (Sugiyono, 2018).

Discussion

Religious Fundamentalism and Violence in the Name of Religion

Religious fundamentalism in general is often associated with the phenomenon of religious understanding which tends to be textual and rigid (Davis, 2006:121), anti-criticism of sacred texts (al-Shahrani, 2005:33; Smith OP, 1978:231), so they give priority to sacred texts over science (Ammerman, 1995:5; Wright, 2010:94; Barlow, 1991:126; Marsden, 2006:7,99), as well as a holistic belief in which everything is embodied in the Scriptures (Sullivan, 2006:24; Lawrence, 1989:27). Fundamentalists are usually known as people who are committed to strict morality by making the text of the Bible as a means of God's guidance (Hilal, 2000:156), and what is equally important is that fundamentalists are usually religious people who believe in having absolute truth in the context of their understanding of sacred texts (Nicolaides, 2016:12-13; Baurmann, 2007: 34).

Religious fundamentalism is often associated with religious fanaticism. In this context, fundamentalists are those who have an attitude of fanaticism in religion (Fann, 2007:53; Nicolaides, 2016:20-21) which results in them being unfriendly, intolerant, and engaging in hostility with others (Kerby-Fulton, 2010:7; Ellison, 2009:413; Mills, 2006:18; Baurmann, 2007:34-35; Baker-Brian, 2011:96). Another description of religious fundamentalism actually positions religious fundamentalism in a stricter frame, where religious fundamentalism is

described as a religious resistance against modernism and liberal theology (Gilmartin, 2011; Marsden, 2006:7; Stolz, 2010:27).

An equally important character of religious fundamentalism is the spirit of contestation in the spread of religious thought, both with brothers and sisters of the same religion and with those of different religions (Bush, 2012:119; Nicolaides, 2016:25;Krause 1998:737). The formation of a political order in accordance with their religious thinking is one of the targets of the contestation carried out by fundamentalists (Nicolaides, 2016:65-81;Ninan 2010:5; Gill, 2009:81; Frosh, 1997:421-422). Finally, there are numerous opinions stating that the increasing religious contestation of fundamentalism has encouraged fundamentalists to commit acts of violence in the name of religion (see Marshall, 2010:503-504). Nicolaides (2016:23) states that there are 'pure' types of Islam, such as *Salafism*, which argue that the early Islamic way of life is the only one that is worth emulating and this gives rise to Jihadist interpretations and actions and these seek to replace democratic states with paternalistic Islamic rule.

Defending Islam Actions as Symptoms of Indonesian Islamic

The phenomenon of religious fundamentalism in the view of many experts arises from the Christian religious tradition. However, some of the symptoms are indicated to belong to and also become the style of other religious traditions, such as in Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. A well-known character of Christian fundamentalism is literalism or the notion of inerrancy (the impossibility of being wrong in the Holy Scriptures) so that it gave birth to a way of acceptance of clergy towards the textual and rigid texts of their religious teachings. They resemble a strong Christian movement that calls for a literal understanding of Scripture. Lewis Smith in his article Fundamentalism Versus Tradition states that fundamentalism is part of the literalism style in biblical interpretation which is used as in religious reasons in dealing with liberals and criticism of reconstruction and reinterpretation of texts.

Talking about the Defending Islam Action at the end cannot be separated from the problem of interpretation of the text of the Qur'anic verse which is alleged to have been defamed, namely Surah al-Maidah verse 51; "O you who believe, do not take the Jews and the Christians as (your) leaders; some of them are leaders for others. Whoever among you takes them as a leader, then indeed that person is one of them. Verily, Allah does not guide the wrongdoers." The heated political situation provoked Ahok – who incidentally is a non-Muslim and is a candidate for governor in the DKI Election – to state that this verse is often used to fool the public into not electing a non-Muslim leader candidate, which of course includes himself. The term "fooled by the letter al-Maidah 51" is what became viral so that it provoked a reaction from the Muslim Ummah on a large scale. There were at least six types of Islamic Defending Actions that had been carried out which resulted in Ahok having to serve a prison sentence of one year and six months.

Indonesian Muslims, especially those who are members of the Action to Defend Islam, consider Ahok's statement to be a form of insult or blasphemy against the Qur'an. Their literalism or textualism in this case states that the verse of the Qur'an cannot be said to be a tool for fooling anyone and that the verse is so true and trustworthy that they are seen as a social guide in choosing a leader. Even this literalism is very evident in the *fatwa* (decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader) of the Central Executive Council of Indonesian Ulema. In the fourth and fifth points there it is stated; "Fourth, stating that the content of Surah al-Maidah verse 51 which contains a prohibition on making Jews and Christians as leaders is a lie, the law is unlawful and includes the category of blasphemy against the Qur'an." By paying attention to some of the contents of the fatwa, one can see the literal nature or textuality of the fatwa. The fatwa was born from a textual understanding of the contents of the letter al-Maidah verse 51,

thus stating that Ahok had tarnished the Qur'an. Thus, the successive waves of Islamic Defense Actions are a reflection of the understanding and spirit of literalism and textualism. Although it is the actualization of textual religious understanding and attitudes, this attitude does not necessarily give rise to a radical and anarchist attitude in responding to the issue of desecrating the Qur'an. They expressed their concerns and protests in ways regulated by Indonesian law, namely demonstrations without anarchy.

Almond et al. (1995) when explaining about fundamentalism, revealed that fundamentalism is a new religious movement which is not limited to 'traditional', 'conservative', and 'orthodox', but is a mixture of these religious typologies. Fundamentalism claims to hold orthodoxy, namely right belief) or orthopraxis, namely the right behavior. They also maintain religious traditions and traditional ways of life from eroding, and they are also experts in creating new methods, creating new ideologies, and adopting the latest organizational processes and structures (Almond et.al, 1995). The characteristics of the ideology of fundamentalism in Christianity are characterized by several actions including: (1) reactive to religious marginalization, (2) selective in following a tradition, (3) moral Manichaeism, namely dividing the world into two parts such as good and evil, (4) absolutist and inerrant understanding (the book cannot be wrong, original from God) and (5) Millenialism and Messianism which assume the coming of the Messiah, savior or priest in the Last Days (Almond et.al, 1995).

The above limitations are actually the limits of the definition of fundamentalism in Christianity, but later expanded its scope as a general phenomenon which is now found in all religions. This means a generalization is made when it seems as if an analysis of the symptoms of religious fundamentalism includes any or all of these variables. If a case or religious phenomenon indicates one variable and does not reflect the other variables, then of course it will be a criticism of Appleby's theory above where these variables are not necessarily attached together in a symptom of fundamentalism. On the other hand, the theory of fundamentalism variables stated above become meaningless when the variables in the theory do not show the facts in a religious movement in various countries.

In the case of Action to Defend Islam, this study would like to provide another review of a case of Islamic fundamentalism. Action to Defend Islam is a religious phenomenon that can be called Islamic fundamentalism but not through negative variables as in theories that have developed. In the case of the Action to Defend Islam in Indonesia, it appears that this action is an actualization of the religious spirit to "defend something fundamental" (Smith, 2000) namely the source of religious teachings (al-Qur'an) which are believed to have been desecrated. However, the defense of this very fundamental thing does not necessarily direct the perpetrators of the action to take other actions that contaminate the general purpose of the action. In the case of the Action to Defend Islam, the perpetrators of the action have actually designed a commitment to stay away from destruction, anarchism, and disturbing the public interest. Each series of actions was thus carefully coordinated properly and transparently with many parties, be it the government, security forces, or the community. Thus, no hidden agenda of destructiveness or violence was found in the Defending Islam Action.

The spirit of the demonstration of Muslims in the Action to Defend Islam reflects the defense of the Qur'an as a basic and fundamental element in Islamic teachings. In this one variable they are fundamentalists with their strong belief in the teachings of their religion. However, they are Indonesian Islamic fundamentalists who have uniqueness and characteristics where holding on to and defending the fundamental aspects does not develop into religious violence and anarchism. Religious fundamentalism – including Islamic fundamentalism– has indeed become a terminology that is led to negative illustrations and even becomes a means of accommodating all evil in religion.

If it relates to the limitations of religious fundamentalism as stated by Almond, Sivan, and Appleby, then what is most likely is the feeling of marginalization of Islam among Islamists for the Action to Defend Islam. From all the Defending Islam Actions that were carried out, the spirit of literalism clearly led the Islamists to the spirit of defending religion. The spirit of this defense is certainly based on the perception that the religion of Islam and especially the Qur'an has been abused. There are fears that their religion will experience a process of marginalization if the abuse case for what it is, is not resolved. The Defending Islam Action can be called a show of religious power because the Defending Islam Action highlights the power of religious symbols starting from the attributes of the clothes used such as turbans, white robes, prayer beads of dhikr.

Marty and Appleby (1995). provide an overview of fundamentalism as a religious trait or character, among others; first, fighting against (fighting back) modernism and secularism, both, fight for the world they want, they fight with resources of choice, , they fight against others or those who are considered to be enemies, and they fight under the Lord. The spirit of Action to Defend Islam does not have a vision of war but a spirit of defense by means of conveying aspirations legally. They use the freedom of expression that is permitted under Indonesian law as a way to actualize their defense of religion. The Islamic Defense Action fulfills some of the symptoms of religious fundamentalism, namely within the limits of defending religion and does not fulfill other symptoms such as moral Manichaeism and millennialism. In the frame of violence and radicalism or fighting other groups, they do not meet this category. Defending Islam is able to eliminate the spirit of war, hostility, and destruction.

The presence of millions of people from various regions in Indonesia to gather around Monas and the Istiqlal Mosque is proof of the spirit of religious defense by all participants of the Action to Defend Islam. Their enthusiasm is based on a very fundamental issue, namely the defense of the Qur'an, although later not all elements of the participants in the Defending Islam Action will have the same spirit. Later in the ensuing discussion, some of the elites in the Action to Defend Islam used this action as a means of raising the masses and forming opinions for political purposes, namely victory in the general election. However, the persistence of the participants in the Defending Islam Action in carrying out various actions on an ongoing basis is considered by some to have led to an attitude of coercion and intervention in the law.

Graham Fuller belongs to the group that restricts the use of the term Islamic fundamentalism to those who understand the Qur'an literally, follow the traditions of the Prophet, and those who believe in absolute truth and are intolerant of others (Fuller, 2004). In this context, Islamic fundamentalism is indicated as a literal understanding of the Qur'an and claims to follow the Prophet are often paralleled with intolerance and inordinate violence (Nicolaides, 2016). The Action to Defend Islam fulfills the element of literal understanding of the Qur'an but they – either because they are successful in controlling it – do not commit violence. They are just being reactive as Appleby pointed out in the previous explanation.

The term fundamentalism is also vulnerable to being associated with violence and religious behavior that threatens social order (Nicolaides, 2016). One example is Bassam Tibi who describes Islamic fundamentalism as a separate group and has nothing to do with Islam. For him, Islamic fundamentalism is defined as a movement that can pose a major challenge to world politics, security and stability. Their movement is an aggressive politicization of religion to achieve non-religious goals. It is not yet known what Tibi's intention is to impose such a limitation on fundamentalism. However, Tibi's explanation on the other hand indicates that Tibi actually positions Islamic fundamentalism as an opponent of Western political expansion. This indication appears when Tibi states that the "Islamic version of the phenomenon" (fundamentalism) wants "an alternative world order" capable of releasing a sufficiently large

fragmentation, so that it can become a "new world disturbance"(Tibi, 2008). Tibi is one of the scholars who associate Islamic fundamentalism with terrorism by basing his views on the jihadist ideology which, according to him, was developed by Bannā and Quṭb. These two figures, Tibi refers to as terrorism intellectuals (Tibi, 2008).

Trying to connect Tibi's opinion with the phenomenon of the Action to Defend Islam implies that there is distance between the religious phenomenon of Muslims in civilization or the culture that Tibi encounters with the religious phenomenon of Muslims in Indonesia. Or it could be that Tibi was carried away by analyses that were contaminated with Islamophobia. Why is Tibi's opinion or theory about Islamic fundamentalism not at all correlated with the Action to Defend Islam? The symptoms of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia – especially in the Action to Defend Islam – are not related to religious violence or terrorism. This means that literalism and the defense of religion as an important element of fundamentalism, do not necessarily lead to religious violence, let alone terrorism.

There is something strange in the mapping and depiction of Islamic fundamentalism in almost all illustrations of Islamic fundamentalism so that almost all concepts regarding Islamic fundamentalism are bad. Nicolaides (2016) refutes such a stance and says all religions need to be given respect in a world in which peace is vital for human sustainability. In Indonesia, an active Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is one group seeking to force the country to adopt one version of Islamic social norms (Arifianto, 2017). The Action to Defend Islam in Indonesia is the antithesis of the growing views on Islamic fundamentalism. They can be called fundamentalist but do not essentially have the character of violence, let alone terrorism. However, there are indeed indications that some of the Muslims involved in the Defending Islam Action are Muslims who are not classified as Muslims who are members of the large NU and Muhammadiyah mass organizations, and indeed some residents of these two large mass organizations also participated in the action. The driving mass organizations, namely FPI and FUI, are not included in the mainstream Indonesian Islamic mass organizations.

Large Islamic organizations in Indonesia, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, keep their distance from the groups or mass organizations that drive the Islamic Defense Action. In the track record of figures and institutions, elites led by these mass organizations are often involved in heated communications. For example, as spread on social media YouTube when Said Aqil Siraj stated that the robe and beard are Arab culture while adding that a beard can reduce intelligence where the longer the beard the more "stupid". Spontaneously, Rizieq Shihab, who felt offended by Siraj's statement in a lecture, judged Aqil Siraj to be inconsequential while judging Siraj as a liberal Kyai who could damage NU. Thus, NU institutionally does not respect the series of Defending Islam Actions that have occurred, but NU has also been unable to stem the enthusiasm of Muslims from all over Indonesia to participate in the Defending Islam Action.

On the other hand, one of the variables that characterizes religious fundamentalism is reactive and interactive resistance to secular modernity. They tend to be absolute, textualist, dualist, and apocalyptic in their knowledge orientation (Tibi, 2008). Meanwhile, Tibi also mentioned that Islamism launched a response to the crisis of modernity by searching for purity or authenticity that refers to Islamic traditions. They also have a cultural purification agenda. However, according to Tibi, Islamism is not completely traditional and authentic. Islamists are completely modern but very contradictory people. They are a semi-modernity that approves the adoption of scientific and technological tools on the one hand (such as e-jihad) and firmly rejects the cultural values raised by it (Tibi, 2008).

The Defending Islam Action is a reaction of textualists or literalists to what they believe to be blasphemy against the Qur'an. Based on the facts, they cannot be judged as a coordinated

movement with the agenda of "creating an alternative world order" as one of the characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism mentioned by Tibi. In the Indonesian context, there is no condition that leads them to violently resist cultural attitudes or the desire to blindly build an Islamic order. This is certainly different from Islamist movements in other countries such as in Iran. The fundamentalist movement in Iran is motivated by the spirit of anti-Western secular modernism which is considered a renaissance and a version of the 'devil's' humanism. Islamists in the Iranian context see themselves in the right position and see others in the wrong position. They refuse to apply the political and social characteristics of modern civilization (Rajaee, 2007).

Modernity grows normally in Indonesia so that Muslims interact well with modernity, especially in the context of living facilities and services. Although there are occasional explosions of friction between modernity and the religious vision of the Muslim Ummah, they are relatively well resolved. In general, Muslims in Indonesia have relatively no problems with modernity in Indonesia and they are actually not very reactive in responding to the changes brought about by modernity. In this context, the phenomenon of Action to Defend Islam does not reflect or is not based on a vision of war or resistance to a certain social order, moreover they are not planning an order as Tibi suggests. The barrenness of secularism in the Indonesian context does not force Indonesian Islamists to transform into banal fundamentalism. Likewise with secularism, almost invisible is the friction between Muslims and other religious people with secularism. It can even be said that secularism cannot thrive in Indonesia because of the strong influence of religions in that society.

The important question is why the spirit of Islamic fundamentalism in the phenomenon of Action to Defend Islam in Indonesia does not develop towards radicalism, extremism, and religious violence? There are at least three factors that cause the Action to Defend Islam not to act so as lead to symptoms of violent religious fundamentalism (Rajaee, 2007).

First, the majority of Indonesian Muslims are moderate Muslims, including those in NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, al-Irsyad, ta'lim congregations, and mosque youth. All these mass organizations carry out community development activities through all areas of community life, such as the economy, education, health, fostering the younger generation, building orphanages, and other business charities. They are so rooted in this archipelago that they are not easily swayed and influenced by divisive issues and patterns of religious thought such as extremism and radicalism. Meanwhile, the activists for the Action to Defend Islam are small mass organizations whose religious thoughts do not really influence the domain of Islamic religious thought in Indonesia.

The participants of the Action to Defend Islam involve the mainstream community, namely members of NU, Muhammadiyah and other mainstream mass organizations. This condition, which also colors the thoughts, patterns of action, and the tendency of the participants in the action does not lead to one pattern of thought, for example the tendency of extreme and radical thinking. The mass of Islamic Defense Action consists of plural Muslims, namely from various communities, both urban and rural. This plurality then becomes the mind control or mindset of the Islamic Defense Action so that it is not influenced by one particular type of extreme thought.

As is well known, the two mass organizations that drive the Islamic Defending Action, such as FPI and FUI, are mass organizations that are categorized as being rather strict in conveying their religious ideas or thoughts even though they are not actually radical as such. Being considered hard here has more to do with their temperamental and blasphemous speeches. However, their strong image did not affect the wave of the Action to Defend Islam when the participants of the Action to Defend Islam came from a diverse society both in terms of religious thought, educational status, profession, and party elements. Once again, under these

conditions, the extreme or violent tendencies of some of the mass organizations driving the Islamic Defense Action are eliminated by most of the plural participants.

The second factor is the support of great scholars such as Ust. Arifin Ilham and Ust. Aa Gym is known as a preacher with a large congregation. These preachers are known to be polite and far from having any harsh thoughts so that they can be accepted by all circles of society. They have good relations with the Government and non-Muslim communities so that many outsiders of the Islamic Defense Action have respect for them. Their presence has been able to inspire cool heads and peace for all participants in the action, plus the advice and prayers they conveyed from the command car for the Action to Defend Islam has been useful.

For example, the appeal for peace delivered by Aa Gym as recorded in online media such as YouTube:

> Amounts don't make us ujub, don't make us takabbur, because effort is only worship and our only helper is Allah SWT… the most important thing about this scandal is that we can change for the better or not? We are busy discussing words that are not good but at the same time, our mouths are just as bad, we lose. With this incident, the most that must change is that we as Muslims become better, agree. … We (should) be wiser in dealing with differences, look for similarities before discussing differences … what makes it difficult for us to get along is the anger that exists, not the differences, let's look for similarities.

From some of the speeches, Aa Gym's advice played a very important role in cooling the atmosphere in the midst of the millions of participants in the action. It has become the hallmark of Aa Gym that it emphasizes the arrangement and control of the heart in the themes of its lectures or speeches. The themes of controlling the heart that were conveyed by Aa Gym were also able to control the emotions and ethics of the participants in the action.

The third factor for the non-development of the Islamic Defense Action demonstration into religious violence and anarchism is the content of other activities of the Islamic Defense Action, namely *dhikr*, and prayer. In every implementation of the Islamic Defense Action, the participants always pray in congregation, listen to *tausyiyah* (lectures) from certain clerics and these are accompanied by joint prayers. It is certain that this activity has a very effective influence in cooling the minds and feelings of the participants in the Defending Islam Action so that they are always under control. Sociologically, religion gives meaning and controls people's social behavior

However, all elements of the Muslim Ummah who are members of the Action to Defend Islam have one spirit of defense and convey a message to the entire community so that they never insult religion (al-Qur'an). They have a literalist and textualist spirit of religious thought of as one of the variables of religious fundamentalism. Thus, the Action to Defend Islam is referred to as a phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism for 3 reasons, namely: (1) the spirit of defending the fundamental aspects of religion, (2) literalist religious thought, (3) the activity contains rituals such as prayer, and *dhikr.* Once again, Islamic fundamentalism in the Action to Defend Islam does not lead to extreme fundamentalism that gives birth to anarchism and religious violence. Thus, the motivation for defending religion does not have to cause violence in the name of religion as in the construction of theories about religious fundamentalism in the world. The case of the Action to Defend Islam as a symptom of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia has its own uniqueness and which due to several Indonesian factors then, the Action to Defend Islam does not turn into religious violence. However, with the absence of religious violence and anarchism in the Action to Defend Islam, the pattern of Islamic fundamentalism in this case can be called

positive Islamic fundamentalism (positive Islamic fundamentalism) or soft Islamic fundamentalism (soft Islamic fundamentalism).

The harsh typology of Islamic fundamentalism is difficult to grow and develop in Indonesia. As said by Azra, there are three reasons that Islamic fundamentalism will not emerge in Indonesia, namely; First, Indonesian Islam tends to be accommodative, second, the ideology of Pancasila is religious and compatible with Islam, and third, the rulers in Indonesia are not as oppressive as leaders tend to be in the Middle East (Azra, 2002).

Conclusion

Defending Islam is an important phenomenon throughout the history of Indonesia. The demonstrations, which carried the theme of defending religion with hundreds of thousands of people, took place in several series of demonstrations which showed a very unique phenomenon in the form of people being controlled and without any violence taking place. Almost all demonstrations or involving crowds around the world usually take place or end in riots and anarchism. However, this was not the case with the Defending Islam Action carried out by Indonesian Muslims. Of the many Defending Islam Actions that have been carried out, we find an important pattern or typology of the movements and actions of the Indonesian Muslims. Some of these typologies include: first, good coordination between important parties such as security forces, religious leaders, and mass organizations participating in the action; second, emphasizing a peaceful atmosphere and avoiding anarchism; third, the main demand is a trial for blasphemy; and fourth, emphasizing on *dhikr* and prayer and congregational prayers.

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