LGBTQI Rights crucified in Indonesia? New Penal Code anti *missio Dei*?

Dr. Jonas Sello Thinane  
Research Institute for Theology and Religion (RITR)  
University of South Africa (UNISA)  
thinajs@unisa.ac.za

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Abstract

Literature continues to document the ways in which Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Questioning (LGBTQI) communities continue to grapple with or face unprecedented abuse in many nations of the world. Members of LGBTQI groups are reported to face discrimination and legal obstacles in countries like Indonesia, since its socio-cultural norms acquiescently discourage homosexuality or gender transitioning in any form. Furthermore, recent amendments to Indonesia's Penal Code, which contain provisions that may endanger the lives and safety of LGBTQI communities in unprecedented ways, have shown that such norms, if relentlessly upheld, strongly influence the direction of public policy. In light of such harmful provisions, one could argue that the rights of the LGBTQI community in Indonesia are being slowly but agonizingly crucified, perhaps analogous to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. The primary proponents of this symbolic crucifixion, who conceal their intentions behind legislative modifications, seem to be politically motivated Islamic religious conservatives who publicly oppose LGBTQI rights. In light of these occurrences, this paper employs the Missio Politica framework and literature reviews to investigate the new Indonesian Penal Code and assess whether or not it violates the internationally acknowledged rights of the LGBTQI community. Drawing from literary works, it uses the term "crucifixion" in a metaphorical manner to emphasize the radical ways in which Islamic conservatism has violated LGBTQI rights over the years, and how these violations are now being formalized through Indonesia's new penal code. To be clear, this paper's accusations are not directed against Islamic teachings per se, but rather against intolerant Islamic conservatives who view LGBTQI preferences as 'crucifiable' sin and advocate for change of state laws to reflect such harmful sentiments. Overall, it is argued that certain sections of the recently enacted Indonesian Penal Code not only offend the LGBTQI community, but also undermine the redemptive goals of *missio Dei* in that country while having global contagion effects. The scope of this paper requires more research as not as much has been done to assess how certain recently enacted provisions of the Indonesian Penal Code impact LGBTQI rights in the context of fulfilling the redemptive goals of the *missio Dei*.

**Keywords:** Missio Dei, Indonesia, Penal Code, Crucified, LGBTQI, Islamic Conservatism

Introduction

The lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQI) communities around the world have suffered from deep social ordeals for many years. Despite commendable global efforts advocating for LGBTQI rights, the list of countries that have not yet codified laws to protect the LGBTQI community from discrimination and hate crimes remains endless. As if that weren't enough, there are several countries that continue to enact clear homophobic laws that criminalize same-sex relationships, or that aggressively target both gender-nonconforming and transgender people. A law outlawing same-sex behaviour was recently in 2023 signed
into law by Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni. Among other things, it carried the possibility of the death penalty for anyone found guilty of "aggravated homosexuality" (Machingura & Shahmanesh, 2023). These include Brunei, Oman, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Malawi and most notably Indonesia, which is the focus of this paper. Although the causes and drivers of anti-LGBTQI sentiment are diverse in most of these countries, religiosity has often been cited in the literature as a key factor behind societal rejection of homosexuality and same-sex marriage (Barnes & Meyer, 2012; McGee, 2016; Janssen & Scheepers, 2019). There is an extensive body of literature supporting this fact in relation to several world religions (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Herman, 1997), generally the contempt with which LGBTQI people have been treated by intolerant Islamic conservatives in Southeast Asia countries (Lee, 2012; Peletz, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2017), but more particularly in Indonesia (Boellstorff, 2004; Habib, 2010; Zulkifli & Rashid, 2016).

Disdainful sentiments with which LGBTQI people have been treated by intolerant Islamic conservatives is well noted by who wrote: 'one of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, explained that LGBT is a disease that must be cured, and further is an aberration to religious norms and natural law', followed similar hostility expressed by a Mr. Aqil Siradj who claimed to have it in good authority that: 'homosexual behaviour is a heinous act, referred to as al-fakhisyah (great sin) that is disgusting and contrary to human nature' (Muthmainnah, 2016:20). Although LGBTQI advocacy has visibly gained political momentum in this country over the years, not so long ago, in July 2015, the Minister of Religious Affairs tacitly conceded that same-sex marriages would never be legitimized as such union contradicted Islamic norms, which are held in high esteem by Indonesian society. As if such open denial and social backlash weren't enough, things took a drastic turn for the worse on December 6, 2022, when the Indonesian parliament passed a new penal code containing provisions that not only violate internationally recognized human rights but also seek to metaphorically crucify LGBTQI people's rights to extinction (Tongat, 2022:188-209).

Using the Christian notion of crucifixion, this paper attempts to metaphorically argue that LGBTQI rights are not only violated by provisions of Indonesia's new penal code, but are crucified on an intolerant Islamic conservative propaganda cross, much like Christ was violated by religious authorities before he was subjected to excruciating pains by crucifixion. It draws on literature research to underscore the ways in which LGBTQI rights have been violated in Indonesia, to the point where such ordeal is manifested in its new penal code. It uses the framework of the missio politica to counter the enactment, scope, and likely enforcement of the new Indonesian Penal Code in the form of certain anti-LGBTQI provisions with the ambitions of the missio Dei. Despite the missiological jargon, this framework is very simple as it seeks to test the coherence between the design of social policies and the objectives of the missio Dei.

Consequently, it will help to problematize the likely enforcement of this new penal code, since it runs counter to the core goals of the missio Dei, particularly the goals of complete salvation and the intended establishment of the kingdom of God. To achieve this, this paper first presents the missio politica as the most appropriate framework to test the coherence of the new Indonesian Penal Code or absence thereof, with the aims of the missio Dei. Second, it introduces the metaphorical use of crucifixion to symbolize the ordeal of the LGBTQI community in Indonesia. Third, the historical expansion of the Christian mission and consequently its advocacy for LGBTQI rights against intolerant Islamic conservatism in Indonesia is briefly discussed. Finally, the plight of the LGBTQI community in the face of the new Indonesian Penal Code is described, with the coherent intention of concluding that its likely enforcement will be contrary to missio Dei's goals.
**Missio politica**

The social science literature continues to admire religion as an all-encompassing integral part that promotes social unity and informs the moral compass of most countries around the world (McGuire, 2008). In terms of Christian missionary theology, the mandate of the *missio Dei* (God’s mission) is to ensure the complete salvation of the whole world, which will lead to the final establishment of the kingdom of God (Arthur, 2010:53). Consequently, this missionary approach becomes all-encompassing and sees God as the source of love at work to ensure full human salvation not only through the Church but through other world religions alike (Bosch, 2011:375; Laing, 2009:89-99). This is clearly described by Arthur (2010) who stated that: ‘the primary emphasis is on what God is doing for the redemption of the world’ (Arthur, 2010:50). Moreover, *missio Dei*, particularly in the light of a consensus following the 1952 International Missionary Council (IMC) conference in Germany, does not limit this engagement to religious communities, but equally invite world politics to participate saving in God’s saving acts (Franklin & Niemandt, 2016).

*Missio politica*, in the sense of the above mandate, designates a framework that ensures coherence between world politics and the scope of the *missio Dei* (Reimer, 2017). Although the roots of this mission framework lie well before the context of the 1952 IMC conference, its mandate was further necessitated by the global political crisis manifested in world wars. At the same time, it was such political crisis, particularly the expulsion of missionaries from China (Latourette, 1966:21-30; Tucker, 1976:97-116), essentially necessitating what Bosch (2011) came to see as unavoidable heightening paradigm shifts in mission theology during a time of deep uncertainty (Bosch, 2011:357). In other words, a review of missiology at the Willingen Conference and the resulting scholarship consistently saw the need for missiology to constantly monitor the direction of world politics and ensure prompt mediation when needed, lest political uncertainties lead to world wars repeat itself. Consequently, this paper uses this framework to reassert the unifying objectives of *missio Dei* against violations of LGBTQI rights by Islamic conservatism manifested in Indonesian politics. Much like the Jewish conservatives manipulated political authorities to execute Christ, intolerant Islamic conservatives are metaphorically accused of not only infiltrating Indonesian political institutions to persecute the LGBTQI community, but even metaphorically crucifying their right to exist. This comes after Indonesia’s Constitutional Court rejected the criminalization of same-sex relationships demanded by conservative groups in 2018 (Satrio, 2022; Wieringa, 2019), but has since deceptively succeeded in influencing Parliament to operationalize such ordeal through the penal code.

**Crucifixion metaphor**

Crucifixion is one of the ancient methods of execution or capital punishment in which, after being flogged or scourged for a crime, the convicted is dragged to either a beam or a large wooden cross fixed in the ground, to which both their outstretched feet and arms are firmly bound or worse nailed through their wrists (Gunnar, 2013). However, it should be mentioned that the intent is not instant death, but rather inflicting pain, suffering and embarrassment, only after that the condemned is left to multiple natural causes such as asphyxiation as the body would have been strained under its own weight and at best by exhaustion restricted blood flow. This form of punishment was most visited on slaves, the commoner, political and religious agitators (Retief & Cilliers, 2003:938-941). Ancient history has records dating as far back as 519 BCE when the Babylon king of Persia, Darius I, crucified some 3,000 political opponents (Geyser-Fouche, 2014:1-12). Similarly, in 88 BCE., the Judean king and high priest, Alexander Jannaeus crucified 800 Pharisaic opponents (Liebowitz, 2015:53-67). And finally the popular account recorded in the Gospels, with vivid images, that Jesus of Nazareth was crucified by Pontius Pilate sometime between CE 32 and 34 (Chapman, 2015; Maier, 1968). According to these accounts, only then, after being scourged and mocked, was
he slowly led to Calvary or Calvary, where he was nailed to the cross and left until the next day to die an agonizing death (Edwards, Gabel & Hosmer, 1986:1455-1463).

The English term metaphor evolved from various language uses such as the 16th-century Old French word métaaphore, which was derived from the Latin metaphorá and in turn itself derived from a Greek term μεταφορά (metaphorá), broadly mean carrying over of something or transference to unoriginality. The purpose of a metaphor is to evoke a familiar scenario, object, or action and use it in a non-literal way to provide understanding or clarity of an entirely different idea. Consistent with the chilling image above, this paper uses the crucifixion metaphorically to describe the contempt with which the rights of LGBTQI people are treated around the world, but particularly in Indonesia. In other words, it figuratively uses the crucifixion in general, but Christ's crucifixion in particular, to explain the excruciating punishment and death slowly being imposed on the rights of LGBTQI people in Indonesia, which has been bolstered by the passage of the new penal code. In such a specific scenario, the rights of Indonesian LGBTQI people are compared to the suffering of Jesus Christ on the Cross, whose rights were subjected to prolonged suffering and consequently nailed to the Penal Code to suffer a slow but agonizing demise.

**Christian mission in Indonesia**

According to literature, the leading religions in Southeast Asia have always been, as indicated above, Islam as the most widespread, followed by Buddhism with over 200 million followers and Hinduism in third place (Briggs & Landon, 1951; Kleinmeyer, 2004). However, this trend appears to be changing in select countries such as Indonesia, where Christianity is the second largest religion after Islam. There is a substantial body of literature suggesting that the spread of Christianity in mainland Southeast Asia was driven by the French missionaries, particularly in Vietnam (Goh, 2005; Moffett, 2014). This was then followed by the arrival of Spanish missionaries in East Timor (Alzor, 2021) and consequently the arrival of Portuguese missionary, Dominican friars, sometimes also known under an Hispanized version of his name, Gaspar de la Cruz (Nawani, 2013:703-708). After these respective arrivals, however, Christianity rapidly found itself on a battlefield marked by conflicting religious interests and claims to spiritual authority over access to mission lands in Southeast Asia (Alberts, 2013:1511-1600). For example, while Christian missionaries worked under some reasonable degree of harmony in many countries in Southeast Asia, such harmony in countries like Brunei and Indonesia was not without constant monitoring (Bouma et al., 2010; Evers, 2014:65-79).

Although there are still many conservative Christians who are openly intolerant of LGBTQI communities (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021:359-374), most contemporary Christian churches not only tolerate but increasingly recognize same-sex marriage to the extent that most Christian denominations has become a home for LGBTQI people (Barringer & Gay, 2017; Halkitis et al., 2009). This of course is despite the Biblical injunctions prohibiting homosexual acts in clear terms such as: ‘you shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination’ (Leviticus 18:12). Nonetheless, discriminatory injunctions are always handled delicately because most Christian societies understand the Bible not only in ways that support their beliefs but also in ways that value social interactions. Furthermore—and maybe even more importantly—the injections from the Old Testament such as the one cited above may not always be applicable in modern Christian societies that primarily uphold Christ's teachings of inclusivity, far as they were unique to the cultural context of ancient Israel. Correspondingly, a growing body of missiological literature argues that the scope of mission indiscriminately includes same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike. Good et al. (2011) advocated a conscious recognition of same-sex couples in marriage theology, arguing that the gospel mission applies to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples (Good et al., 2011:54). A similar stance is taken by Kaunda (2022), who argues that the mandate of the missio Dei encompasses all people, including the LGBTQI community without any distinction (Kaunda, 2022: Oct 31).
Aside from the historical doctrinal disputes between Christianity and Islam (Akbar, 2002; Ayoub, 1991), the very welcoming gesture of Christian churches towards LGBTQI communities exacerbates conservative Islamic hostility towards Christianity and motivates them to find new ways to get rid of it (Balkin, Watts & Ali, 2014). In other words, the fact that more Christian churches are hosting a growing number of LGBTQI people in Indonesia, as recently done by the Bethani Church in Yogyakarta and the Ledalero Catholic School of Philosophy in Maumere (Davis, 2022: Dec 07), inevitably generates a more conservative Islamic hostility towards Christian missionaries. It was not surprising, therefore, that such animosity was manifested by the passage of a law in 2006 requiring minority religious missionary organizations to collect the signatures of 90 Muslim families before they can begin their work. Consequently, it was such a passage that authorized the government authorities to shut down many Indonesian Christian churches. The ensuing demonstration demonstrates the significant impact that conservatives, in general, and Islamic conservatives specifically, have on both common Indonesians and public figures who are employed by the state to further Islamic interests.

Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia

Islam is the largest religion in Indonesia and the most populous Muslim-majority country, attracting more than 200 million of Indonesia's population, most of whom belong to Sunni Muslims, followed by denominations such as Shia Islam and Ahmadi Muslims (Drewes, 1968; Kersten, 2017; Wanandi, 2002). Although Islam is the largest religion, this country transitioned to a secular democracy in 1998 and has since maintained that status, officially recognizing about six formal religions, of which Christianity is one (Barton, 2010:471-496). Without going into the complexities of the democratization framework, as they are outside the scope of this paper, it is important to merely mention that Indonesia has made commendable changes both socially and politically over the past few decades (Diprose, McRae & Hadiz, 2019). At the same time, however, Islamic influence has remained very strong and continues to play a central role, particularly in Indonesia's political public sphere (Fealy & White, 2008; Samson, 1968; Zuhri, 2012). The incompatibility of strong Islamic influence with the advance of democracy has been clearly quantified by Roweley and Smith (2009), who show that in most Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia there remains a deficit in liberal rights and the manifestation of democracy. All the same, given that the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim, this character may very well be expected without condemnation, notwithstanding that it is not a typical Islamic state like Saudi Arabia or Iran.

Consequently, maintaining Indonesia's democratic status has not been without major challenges from Islamic conservative groups, which have been pushing for strict implementation of Sharia law and thus the establishment of a fully Muslim country. These groups are gradually conquering mainstream Indonesian public opinion, with their influence evident at both regional and national levels. As a result, support for Indonesia's Islamization continues to grow and appears to be gaining the upper hand through key state apparatuses. Indeed, the growing literature addressing the plight of the LGBTQI community in Indonesia strongly suggests that the most hateful opposition to the LGBTQI community comes from religious authorities, particularly Islamic conservative organizations. Conversely, extreme caution should be exercised in creating the impression that Islam is the only anti-LGBTQI community in Indonesia, as there is an extensive sample of studies that throw such accusations equally at the door of Christianity (Setyawan, 2022:312-317). Even if this is the case, since social norms in this country are heavily influenced by Islamic religious norms, which are inherently deeply conservative, the literature consequently identifies Islamic conservatism as the main cause of the increasing homophobic attitudes or anti-LGBTQI sentiments in Indonesia (Butt, 2018:402-434; Nisya & Sundrijo, 2022:33-49). As the next section will show in detail, the proliferation of Islamic conservative interests in the state apparatuses poses a serious threat, not only to the full institutionalization of democracy in
Indonesia, but even more devastating to the plight of the LGBTQI community and their already dwindling rights in Indonesia this country.

**LGBTQI Community in Indonesia**

To the extent that traditional mores expressed through public policies in Indonesia generally reject homosexuality, same-sex relationships and transition, LGBTQI citizens continue to face legal challenges and growing prejudices. Because this country has no specific laws to protect the LGBTQI community from hate crimes or discrimination, in a province like Aceh, homosexuality and same-sex relations are punishable by public flogging or imprisonment as such conduct remains illegal under Islamic Sharia law. An example of such unprecedented human torture was seen in the 2015 incident involving two women under the age of 20 who were arrested by Sharia Special Police after they were suspected of being lesbians for embracing in public, and were subsequently sent for religious rehabilitation after being detained for three consecutive nights. Tendencies characterized by beliefs that classify homosexuality as some form of mental disorder or illness have gained authority in countries like Indonesia, especially when such a narrative is promoted by respected bodies, as was the case in 2016 of the leading public institutions such as the Indonesian Psychiatrists Association (IPA), which gave the impression that Homosexuality and transgenderism could be cured with professional intervention (Jowett, 2016:2). Notably, this came just a few years after the then Deputy Mayor of Banda Aceh, Illiza Saaduddinin Djamal, announced in 2012 that a special team would be deployed to alert the people of Aceh to the threat of LGBTQI tolerance, and subsequently published a picture of herself on her Instagram account with a gun, vowing to completely eradicate and cracking down on same-sex relations from Aceh province (Knight 2021).

Consistent in her views, in 2013 she pushed for a much stricter statute to eradicate same-sex relationships, believing it was a social thread and a disease that must not infect the purity of the Islamic community. Problematizing tolerance of homosexuality she was quoted as saying: ‘Even if one case of homosexuality is found, it’s already a problem… we are really concerned about the behavior and activities of the gay community, because their behavior is deviating from the Islamic Sharia’ (McCormick, 2013; Nilsson, 2018:30-36). Consequently, in 2014, this Sharia-ruled province enacted Law Qanun Jinayat No. 6/2014, which not only outlaws same-sex relationships but also enforces a hunt down on the LGBTQI community, which will then be punished with a thrashing of about a hundred public lashes or at best serve a maximum of hundred months imprisonment (Nilsson, 2018:1). Disturbingly, in November 2021, authorities in the same province publicly flogged two gay men who were caught having intercourse by a vigilante mob, who invaded their privacy and turned them over to police authorities.

Given the above image of despicable attacks on same-sex relationships, it is immediately apparent how the lack of public laws protecting the rights of LGBTQI people has led to their public intolerance, which subsequently led to the passage of harsh laws that pose a serious threat to their safety and security in Indonesia. Even more worrying is that the discriminatory sentiments, while sometimes born from ordinary citizens, largely appear to be compounded by personal prejudices held by government officials, which ultimately constitute social sanctions for harassment of the LGBTQI community in Indonesia. To make matters worse, such officials use their positions of power to influence legislators to enact censorship policies that stifle freedom of speech, public communication, or any brandishing of LGBTQI's discontent and suffering. As a result, the LGBTQI community in countries like this finds itself in a kind of hostage situation, with mainstream society and its leaders normalizing the abuse of their rights and even making it difficult for them to express their plight to the global world. This is certainly equivalent to a crucifixion situation where the crucified suffers excruciating pain but cannot do much since their hands and feet are tightly nailed to the cross in the form of national repressive policies. Indonesia’s new penal code, discussed below, is perhaps the
perfect example of LGBTQI rights being nailed and crucified to national politics by the authorities.

The New Penal Code in Indonesia

The Indonesian Criminal Code, commonly known in Indonesian language Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (meaning ‘Book of Penal Code’) contains laws and regulations which constituted the basis upon which Indonesia’s criminal law is developed (Mahmud, 2011; Najih, 2018). Historically, this penal code stems from Dutch colonial law which had entered force in 1886 and has never been fully repealed beyond the Indonesia's declaration of independence from the Dutch rule on 17 August 1945 (Strang, 2008). Cautiously, the need for reform became clear and led to the establishment of several working groups that were supposed to take on the complex task of reviewing around 786 articles, but repeatedly did not find each other, which led to incomplete drafting processes. Finally, in 2005, the first bill was introduced, which formed the preliminary basis for subsequent bills (ten Voorde, 2017:295-313). In 2013, as expected, the Legislative Commissions failed to adopt provisions on social and moral issues, particularly provisions on cohabitation and the definition of adultery (Article 484), until it was too late to finalize the bill before the 2014 elections (Anggraeni, 2020; Renggong, 2014). On September 24, 2019, when the Indonesian parliament was expected to vote on a partially watered-down version, public outcry and mass protests erupted against several problematic bills, including the Privacy Act (Article 412), the Witchcraft Act (252), and many others resulting in such a process being halted (Widyawati, 2020:171-186).

Ultimately, on 6 December 2022, the House of Representatives’ plenary session voted to adopt the new Penal Code with 624 articles and its amendments (Chamas, Ibrahim & Mann, 2022). Of greater relevance to the rights of the LBTBQI community, however, is the fact that the new law extended the concept of adultery to include unmarried persons, including premarital and extramarital cohabitation. Although Indonesia has never formally criminalized same-sex relations at the national level in the past, the passage of this new penal code not only will criminalize it, but goes so far as to give authorities the right to invade the privacy of the LGBTQI community in hopes of catching them in intimate actions. Critics of this new penal code, particularly regarding the law criminalizing consensual sex outside of marriage, have argued that such bills constitute a serious violation of the right to privacy and disproportionately affect the LGBTQI community, given that same-sex marriage is currently not recognized in Indonesia. In the likely event that passage of this Penal Code sees the light of day, it will not only mark the beginning of an unmitigated human rights catastrophe in Indonesia, but in many ways will agonizingly violate or crucify the rights of the LGBTQI community, as shown below.

Penal Code crucifying LGBTQI’s rights

As mentioned above, comparable to how Roman officials were used by religious conservatives to ensure the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, Indonesia's new penal code bears traces of Islamic conservatives motivated to crucify the rights of Indonesia's LGBTQI community. Given that Indonesia remains the largest Muslim-majority nation in the world, given the rise of Islamic conservative influence over public opinion in recent years, it is unlikely that the LGBTQI community will ever find relief from the excruciating pain these laws entail after their formal adoption. In light of this, the LGBTQI community's rights in Indonesia are reportedly being subjected to terrible suffering that is somewhat similar to that of Christ, who was crucified and suffered from agonizing pain that ultimately led to his death. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this new penal code will soon be utilized to further harm LGBTQI rights in numerous other contexts, possibly even outside of Indonesia.

First, not only will this violate the right to privacy in theory, but in practice it will allow law enforcement to invade people's private spaces and consequently expose them to mob harm. As indicated above, the unwarranted weaponization of the Indonesian public against LGBTQI
people, such as when a vigilante mob raided the home of two gay men while they were having sex, resulting in them being publicly flogged 77 times each (Knight, 2021: January 28), will not only gain momentum in this heteronormative new penal code, but will also enjoy formalized protection. Second, since Indonesia currently bans same-sex marriages, the enactment of this new penal code, which by its very nature restricts freedom of expression, is sure to have a profound impact on marginalized efforts to push for formal recognition of same-sex marriages. As indicated in Sullivan (2022), this concern is voiced by the director of the University of Melbourne’s Asia Institute, Professor Vedi Hadiz, who also argued that the passage of this new penal code means that LGBTQI people are not at all allowed to have sex, raise concerns about their own suffering or at best plead for mere recognition (Sullivan 2022). Thirdly, contrary to what has been mentioned about LGBTQI people being able to find a spiritual home in Christian churches, Article 302 of the new penal code not only prohibits leaving a religion or kepercayaan (belief) as apostasy (ridda), but also criminalizes persuading other non-believers or believers of another religion. Effectively, this provision goes against the very second surah of the Qur’an by curtailing the rights to religious freedom and restrict the LGBTQI people from choosing to leave homophobic conservative religious systems for more welcoming religions such as Christianity.

As correctly noted by Laskowska (2016), for the Muslim community, apostacy or a situation in which a Muslim rejects the Islamic faith, is primarily considered a serious crime warranting a punishment punishable by death (Laskowska 2016:249). Finally, the already growing perception that the LGBTQI community is suffering from some form of mental illness will certainly not only regain strength but even formalize the subjection of LGBTQI people to unfair psychiatric diagnoses. Consequently, what remains clear is the fact that the passage of this new penal code is more than a violation of basic human rights and will essentially formalize the torturous crucifixion of the LGBTQI rights to even exist in Indonesia and as such is contrary to the core objectives of the missio Dei.

Conclusion

Consequently, in an unconventional way, this paper relied upon literature and attempted to use the missio politica framework to underscore how some provisions of Indonesia’s new penal code contradicts the objectives of missio Dei. It endeavoured to make use of the notion of crucifixion as the suitable metaphor to emphatically symbolize the ordeal of LGBTQI community in Indonesia. To that end, it argued or called upon countries of the world to not only condemn, but play an active role in protecting the rights of the LGBTQI community not only in Indonesia, but across the world as international law obliges. This is premised on faith there is in the power of a worldwide public outcry to defend LGBTQI communities’ rights—not just in Indonesia, but in every country where identifiable state laws are violating the rights of minority communities. Thus, this paper believes that the LGBTQI community, both in Indonesia and globally, will persist in experiencing suffering without any means of amelioration unless the global community emulates Simon of Cyrene who helped Jesus Christ carry the cross. Such intervention is particularly warranted because it is evident that countries like Indonesia will never fulfill their promises to protect the LGBTQI community from harm unless the collective international communities intervene decisively. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it concludes that the current version of Indonesia’s new penal code will severely impede the objectives of missio Dei while also violating the LGBTQI community’s basic human rights.
References


**Conflict of Interest Statement**: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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